Notes on marriage markets with weak externalities

dc.contributor.author	Fonseca-Mairena, María
dc.contributor.author	Triossi, Matteo
dc.date.accessioned	2024-08-06T20:05:29Z
dc.date.available	2024-08-06T20:05:29Z
dc.date.issued	2023
dc.identifier.uri	http://repositorio.ucm.cl/handle/ucm/5545
dc.description.abstract	We consider marriage markets with externalities. We focus on weak externalities, that is, markets in which each agent is primarily concerned about her partner. We formalize and prove the claim that weak externalities are not so significant in the marriage market: in this case, the ω-core and the α-core coincide and are both nonempty. In addition, we show that, if we allow agents to block matchings without changing their mate, the results do not longer hold.	es_CL
dc.language.iso	en	es_CL
dc.rights	Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 Chile	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/	*
dc.source	Bulletin of Economic Research, 75(4), 860-868	es_CL
dc.subject	Core	es_CL
dc.subject	Marriage market	es_CL
dc.subject	Matching	es_CL
dc.subject	Stability	es_CL
dc.subject	Weak externalities	es_CL
dc.title	Notes on marriage markets with weak externalities	es_CL
dc.type	Article	es_CL
dc.ucm.facultad	Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Económicas	es_CL
dc.ucm.indexacion	Scopus	es_CL
dc.ucm.indexacion	Isi	es_CL
dc.ucm.uri	onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/boer.12384	es_CL
dc.ucm.doi	doi.org/10.1111/boer.12384	es_CL

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